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Abstract
In both US and EU merger control, merger-speci￿c e¢ ciencies are recognized
as a possible defense for horizontal mergers that raise competition concerns.
We introduce the Werden-Froeb-index (WFI) to assist in evaluating these e¢ -
ciencies. The index measures the average reduction in marginal costs required
to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the merger is con-
summated. It has low information requirements and can deal with any number
of ￿rms in price- or quantity-competition merging fully or partially, and a large
class of demand and cost functions. We show how the WFI complements Phase
I merger inquiries as a screening mechanism.
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1 Introduction
When the analysis is restricted ceteris paribus to competition e⁄ects, economic the-
ory predicts unambiguously that (partial) horizontal mergers lead to anticompetitive
e⁄ects and consumer detriment.1 In light of this, competition authorities around
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1the world follow them closely. Yet, the market dynamics of consolidations, hostile
take-overs, friendly (partial) acquisitions and mergers can also generate important
synergies.2 Proper merger policy weighs such merger speci￿c e¢ ciencies against the
anticompetitive e⁄ects of the merger.
In the last decade merger control in both US and EU has opened up to e¢ ciency
arguments.3 They have been admitted in cases to supplement market concentra-
tion analyses based on the Hirschmann-Her￿ndahl-index (HHI). The US guidelines,
revised in 1997 on this point, read:
￿[T]he merging ￿rms must substantiate e¢ ciency claims so that the Agency
can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each as-
serted e¢ ciency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of
doing so), how each would enhance the merged ￿rm￿ s ability and incentive
to compete, and why each would be merger-speci￿c. E¢ ciency claims will
not be considered if they are vague or speculative or otherwise cannot be
veri￿ed by reasonable means.￿(US Department of Justice and US Federal
Trade Commission, 1997, Section 4)
Similarly, the following section was adopted into the 2004 European merger guidelines:
￿The Commission considers any substantiated e¢ ciency claim in the over-
all assessment of the merger. It may decide that, as a consequence of the
e¢ ciencies that the merger brings about, there are no grounds for declar-
ing the merger incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article
2(3) of the Merger Regulation. This will be the case when the Commis-
sion is in a position to conclude on the basis of su¢ cient evidence that
the e¢ ciencies generated by the merger are likely to enhance the ability
and incentive of the merged entity to act pro-competitively for the bene-
￿t of consumers, thereby counteracting the adverse e⁄ects on competition
which the merger might otherwise have.￿(Commission of the European
Communities, 2004, Paragraph 77)
As a result of the ex ante nature of merger control, the balancing of competition
and e¢ ciency e⁄ects is complicated in practice. E¢ ciencies in particular are ￿easy
to promise, yet may be di¢ cult to deliver.￿ 4 This makes the evaluation of noti￿ed
mergers costly, requiring considerable resources, time, and expertise. Competition
authorities increasingly employ sophisticated economic analysis, including computer
2See Williamson (1968) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990; 2001).
3See Kolasky and Dick (2003) on the evolution of US merger control and Lyons (2004) on that
in the EU.
4White (1987), p.18. Fisher (1987) adds that: ￿Such claims are easily made, and, I think, often
too easily believed.￿(op.cit., p.36). See also Lagerloef and Heidhues (2005) and Fabrizi and Lippert
(2006).
2simulation techniques, to assist in the weighing of the various e⁄ects of a merger.5
Combining structural oligopoly models with econometric speci￿cations to quantify
predicted market reactions following a merger, these methods advance merger control.
Yet, the approach also has limitations. The analyses often are di¢ cult, expensive
and time-consuming to perform, even when based on static games and employing
only a limited number of variations in demand and cost functions. In addition to
these enforcement costs, allowing e¢ ciency argument invites rent seeking from ￿rms.
Moreover, the studies often remain con￿dential and undisclosed, which forfeits their
potential bene￿t of making merger decisions more transparent.6
In this paper, we propose an alternative method to assess horizontal merger e¢ -
ciencies, introducing the Werden-Froeb-index (WFI). The WFI is based on Compen-
sating Marginal Cost Reductions (CMCRs), a concept developed in Werden (1996)
and Froeb and Werden (1998) and generalized in this paper. The CMCR of each
commodity involved in the merger is the reduction in the commodity￿ s (marginal)
production costs after the merger that is minimally required to obtain the status quo
in terms of quantities and prices that exists prior to the merger.7 The WFI is a
weighted average of generalized CMCRs, with the weights being the shares in total
production of the merged ￿rm. It is a measure of the relative savings in total (mar-
ginal) cost of producing the commodities involved in the merger, that is required to
restore pre-merger equilibrium values.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, generalized CMCRs are
established for any number of di⁄erentiated goods and ￿rms, of which two or more
merge, fully or partially, when competition is either on quantities (Cournot) or on
prices (Bertrand). Section 3 de￿nes the Werden-Froeb-index. Section 4 sets out its
information requirements. Section 5 discusses how to implement the WFI practically
in merger control, supplementing standard HHI-analysis. Several numerical examples
of mergers in a representative market illustrate the power of the measure. Section
6 concludes. A short routine in MATLAB
R ￿
for calculating the WFI in a typical
merger is given in the appendix.
2 Compensating Marginal Cost Reductions
The conceptual idea of compensating marginal cost reductions is to establish the
e¢ ciency gains that minimally need to materialize in order to o⁄-set a merger￿ s
competition-reducing e⁄ects. CMCRs thereby replicate the market status quo in
5See Werden and Froeb (1996; 2006), Werden (1997), and Bergeijk and Kloosterhuis (2005).
6See Goppelsroeder and Schinkel (2005) for a more extensive critique.
7Independently, Verboven et al. (1999), R￿ller et al. (2001) and Stennek and Verboven (2003)
developed a similar concept, which they call ￿ Minimum Required E¢ ciencies￿(MREs), in reports
for the European Commission. MREs are de￿ned as the ratio of the anticompetitive price increase
as a result of the merger over the rate at which the (claimed) actual merger-speci￿c cost savings are
passed on to the consumers.
3terms of prices and quantities. Consumers would be indi⁄erent between allowing or
blocking the merger, if these cost savings would indeed result from the merging parties
integrating their business.8 In any given industry, the CMCR commodity values
depend on speci￿cs like the nature of the (marginal) production costs, commodity
characteristics, and the type of market competition. Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb
developed the concept for a limited number of common settings, involving constant
marginal costs and two ￿rms merging fully into one. Werden (1996) models Bertrand
competition among di⁄erentiated substitute commodities. Froeb and Werden (1998)
considers Cournot competition among producers of a homogenous good that di⁄er
only in their share of the market.9 In this section, we generalize these contributions
in one integrated setup.10
Note that the concept of CMCRs abstracts from any post-merger reallocation of
production to the more e¢ cient divisions of the merged ￿rm. Although possibly re-
strictive in the special case of a single homogenous good, it is this assumption that
makes the concept generally practical.11 Furthermore, in the following we abstract
from at least two important e⁄ects of mergers that involve di⁄erentiated commodities.
The ￿rst is that the integrated ￿rm may have a post-merger incentive to reconsider
its portfolio of products, repositioning them by adjusting their di⁄erentiation, ex-
tending or possibly discontinuing some of its product lines.12 We assume these e⁄ects
away by considering a ￿xed product spectrum. Second, we assume that the mode of
competition does not change as a result of the merger.
Consider a market in which n (possibly slightly) di⁄erentiated products are pro-
duced and supplied by K ￿ n di⁄erent ￿rms. Each commodity is produced by
only one ￿rm, but some ￿rms may produce several commodities.13 In particular, we
assume that ￿rm k produces mk di⁄erent commodities, with
PK
k=1 mk = n. With-
out loss of generality, we number commodities such that the ￿rst m1 commodities
8This approach therefore is in line with the consumer welfare standard, as discussed further in
Section 5. It does not recognize e¢ ciency defense arguments that, although possibly enhancing total
welfare, are not passed on to a su¢ cient extent to consumers, such as merger-speci￿c reductions in
￿xed cost (overhead). See Farrell and Shapiro (2001).
9Stennek and Verboven (2003), Section 4 analyzes these same basic models. In addition, it
considers a merger between two ￿rms out of three, competing on prices in a homogenous commodity
produced against di⁄erent constant marginal cost levels.
10In the following, we derive CMCRs in absolute value. In Werden (1996), as well as in Stennek
and Verboven (2003), the required marginal cost reductions, and MREs, are expressed relative to
original marginal cost levels. In Froeb and Werden (1998), a ￿proportionate￿CMCR is presented
that is a special case of the WFI￿ see footnote 23 in Section 3.
11Stennek and Verboven (2003) include this post-merger cost-minimizing reallocation of produc-
tion in their presentation of the MREs for the most e¢ cient ￿rm in the merger only. The issue is
discussed further in Section 5.
12Gandhi et al. (2005) develop simulation analyses in which product variety increases with con-
centration. Berry and Waldfogel (2001) ￿nd evidence to the e⁄ect in radio broadcasting.
13We introduce this setup for notational convenience. One way to interpret it is as commodities
being (slightly) ￿rm-speci￿c. Yet, for both Cournot and Bertrand competition, in the two subsections
below, we also consider the special case of purely homogenous commodities.
4are produced by ￿rm 1, commodities m1 + 1;:::;m1 + m2 by ￿rm 2, commodities
m1 + m2 + 1;:::;m1 + m2 + m3 by ￿rm 3 and so on. Note that this numbering can
always be done in such a way that the ￿rst l ￿rms are the merging ￿rms. Also de￿ne
nk =
Pk
j=1 mk. Obviously, n0 = 0 and nK = n.
Demand for product i is given by the demand function Qi (p) = Qi (p1;:::;pn),
where pj > 0 is the price of the j￿ th product, and p 2 Rn
++ is the full price vector.
The function Qi (p) is assumed to be positive, continuous and twice continuously
di⁄erentiable everywhere. Moreover, we assume
@Qi(p)
@pi ￿ 0: Commodity i is called a
substitute for commodity j at p if
@Qi(p)
@pj > 0: Mergers may also involve complemen-
tary goods previously sold by competing ￿rms￿ commodities i and j are complements
at p, if
@Qi(p)
@pj < 0￿ in which case the merger may, in fact, decrease prices. Assuming
the conditions for the inverse function theorem to hold, the inverse demand functions
exist as the prices that clear the market at the quantities produced. Denote the in-
verse demand function for product i by Pi (q) = Pi (q1;:::;qn) and assume that they
are also positive, continuous and twice continuously di⁄erentiable.









= Ck (qk), which is strictly positive,
increasing in its arguments, and twice continuously di⁄erentiable. By ci (qk) we will
denote the marginal costs associated to product i (where nk￿1+1 ￿ i ￿ nk). Without
making any more speci￿c assumptions on the cost functions, we will assume that all
equilibria correspond to solutions of the ￿rst-order conditions and that second-order
conditions for a global maximum are always satis￿ed. After the ￿rst l ￿rms out
of the pool of K have merged, the merged entity subsequently faces cost function
e C (q1;:::;qnl) = e C (q1;:::;ql). Again, this cost function is strictly positive, nonde-
creasing in its arguments and twice continuously di⁄erentiable. Marginal costs with
respect to the production of commodity i (1 ￿ i ￿ nl) are denoted by e ci (q1;:::;qnl).
In the following two subsections, we derive CMRCs as the absolute marginal
costs reductions required to replicate the pre-merger equilibrium in the post-merger
market for fully integrating ￿rms in Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively.
The section closes with a characterization of CMCRs for partial acquisitions.
2.1 CMCRs in Cournot Competition
Suppose that ￿rms use quantities as their strategic variables and prices adjust in
such a way that markets clear. For illustrative purposes, ￿rst consider the special
case where, before the full merger, each ￿rm produces only one product variety￿ that
is K = n, mk = 1 and nk = k for every k. Firm i, producing commodity i, then
chooses qi by pro￿t maximization
max
qi
Pi (q)qi ￿ Ci (qi):
5The ￿rst-order condition for this problem is
Pi (q) + qi
@Pi (q)
@qi
￿ ci (qi) = 0; (1)
for ￿rm i. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities q￿ are a vector (q￿
1;:::;q￿
n); such
that (1) is satis￿ed for every ￿rm i. The associated equilibrium prices are given by
p￿
i = Pi (q￿), for i = 1;:::;n.
Next, consider the e⁄ect of a merger between the ￿rst l ￿rms. The merged entity￿ s
pro￿t maximization problem then becomes
max
q1;:::;ql
P1 (q)q1 + P2 (q)q2 + ::: + Pl (q)ql ￿ e C (q1;q2;:::;ql);
from which the system of ￿rst-order conditions follows as:






+ ::: + ql
@Pl (q)
@q1
￿ e c1 (q1;:::;ql) = 0






+ ::: + ql
@Pl (q)
@q2
￿ e c2 (q1;:::;ql) = 0 (2)
. . .






+ ::: + ql
@Pl (q)
@ql
￿ e cl (q1;:::;ql) = 0;
for the ￿rst l commodities. Together with conditions (1) for the ￿rms l+1 to n which
remain outside the merger, the solution to the post-merger ￿rst-order conditions
de￿nes the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (q￿￿;p￿￿).
Typically, production levels for both the merged ￿rms (k = 1;:::;l) and the inde-
pendent ￿rms (k = l + 1;:::;n) will be di⁄erent from the pre-merger Cournot-Nash
equilibrium levels. However, for given quantities q and associated prices p given by
pi = Pi (q), we can explicitly determine marginal costs e c1, e c2; up to e cl such that the
post-merger ￿rst-order conditions (2) are satis￿ed for those chosen quantities. The
post-merger ￿rst-order conditions are thus employed to endogenously determine the
marginal cost functions ci that result in a speci￿c output vector q. For an arbitrary
output vector q, this is generally problematic. It requires a full understanding of the
inverse demand functions at these quantities. Moreover, the ￿rst-order conditions
for the other ￿rms also change for q 6= q
￿. The CMCR concept circumvents these
di¢ culties by asking for which values of e ci the post-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantities q￿￿ are exactly equal to the pre-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium quan-
tities q￿. The bene￿t of this status quo approach is that the ￿rst-order conditions
of the nonmerging ￿rms remain the same and can therefore be disregarded in the
analysis.
The necessary absolute marginal cost reductions for each product i to exactly
reproduce pre-merger quantities and market prices after the merger follow from com-
6bining conditions (1) and (2), as follows
4ci ￿ ci (q
￿
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Note that if all commodities involved in the merger are substitutes, the necessary
cost reduction is positive, i.e., 4ci > 0: If all involved commodities are complements,
4ci < 0. When there is a mixed bundle of substitutes and complements involved in
the merger, the signs of 4ci are ambiguous.14 Finally note that the values of 4ci
are uniquely determined at the status quo equilibrium, because each commodity￿ s
total output remains the same. We need not put any restrictions on the shape of the
post-merger cost functions outside equilibrium.15
Next, we generalize the analysis to cover mergers of any arbitrary number of ￿rms
l that each produce an arbitrary number of varieties mk, with k = 1;:::;l. Before





qjPj (q) ￿ Ck (qk);







￿ ci (qk) = 0 for i = nk￿1 + 1;:::;nk: (5)
There is a set of such ￿rst-order conditions for every merging ￿rm.
14 Note also that the necessary e¢ ciencies might be so large that the post-merger marginal costs
need to fall below zero, in which case ￿ci > ci. We do not a priori rule out this (impossible)
requirement, since the WFI deals with it quite naturally, as explained in Section 3.
15Some intuition for the speci￿cation of these CMCRs follows from considering total revenue
of the merged ￿rm, e R(q) =
Pl
j=1 qjPj (q), and revenue of ￿rm i before the merger, which is
Ri (q) = qiPi (q). The absolute CMCR for product i can be written as
4ci = MRii (q￿) ￿ g MRi (q￿); (4)
in which g MRi (q) =
@ e R(q)
@qi and MRii (q) =
@Ri(q)
@qi are the associated marginal revenues. Hence,
in order to assure that post-merger quantities equal pre-merger levels, the marginal cost reduction
should exactly outbalance the reduction in marginal revenue from an increase in producing more
of product i. These reductions in marginal revenue are due to the fact that the negative spill-over
e⁄ects of an increase of qi on prices of the other commodities is internalized, which typically reduces
production and increases prices.
7It is convenient to employ some matrix notation from now onwards. Let the





























C C C C C
A
: (6)
This matrix is the transpose of the Jacobian matrix of the inverse demand functions
of the products supplied by ￿rm i, or Pni￿1+1 (q);:::;Pni (q), with respect to the
quantities of the commodities produced by ￿rm j, that is, qnj￿1+1;:::;qnj. Also
denote by q(nl)=(q1;:::;qnl)
0 the vector of quantities of the commodities sold by
the merging ￿rms, by p(nl)=(p1;:::;pnl)
0 the vector of corresponding prices, and by
c(nl)=(c1;:::;cnl)
0 the vector of relevant marginal costs. The pre-merger ￿rst-order










P11 0 ￿￿￿ 0
0 P22
. . .






collects the quantity e⁄ects of all the products involved in the merger.
We use a similar notation for the post-merger situation. The ￿rst-order conditions











= 0; for i = 1;:::;nl;











P11 P21 ￿￿￿ Pl1
P12 P22
. . .






is the transpose of the Jacobian of the inverse demand function of all merging ￿rms
with respect to the quantities of all commodities they supply. This matrix collects
all the post-merger quantity e⁄ects.




(nl) = (P0 ￿ P1)q
(nl); (9)
in which




0 ￿P21 ￿￿￿ ￿Pl1
￿P12 0
. . .






compares pre- and post-merger quantity e⁄ects at the status quo.16
The analysis specializes straightforwardly to the case of homogenous commodities
and di⁄erent market shares. Homogeneity implies a single inverse demand function,
P (q1;:::;qn) = P (q1 + ::: + qn). Hence,
@P(q)
@qi = P 0 (q) for all i. Furthermore, the
marginal costs post-merger must be equal for ￿ each￿merged product. Moreover, from
(2) it follows immediately that for each merging ￿rm i it must be that e ci = e c =
P (q) + P 0 (q)
Pl
j=1 qj, where l is the number of merging ￿rms. It follows then from
equation (3) that the compensating reduction in marginal costs for ￿rm i is given by








Note that our setup can deal with any combination of di⁄erentiated and homogeneous
commodities as well.
2.2 CMCRs in Bertrand Competition
If ￿rms strategically set prices rather than quantities, we can determine the CMCRs
along lines similar to the Cournot case. Consider the general case of a pool of ￿rms
each producing one or more di⁄erentiated goods at varying costs, in which l ￿rms














16The absolute CMCRs in (9) have an interpretation similar to those in (4). Denote by R(nk) (q) = Pnk
i=nk￿1+1 qiPi (q) and e R(q) =
Pl
k=1 R(nk) (q) =
Pnl
i=1 qiPi (q) the pre-merger revenue of the k￿ th
￿rm and the post-merger revenue of the merged ￿rm, respectively. The compensating marginal cost
reduction for a product i which was produced by ￿rm k before the merger (that is, nk￿1+1 ￿ i ￿ nk)









i (q￿) ￿ g MRi (q￿):




(pj ￿ cj (qk))
@Qj (p)
@pi
= 0; for i = nk￿1 + 1;:::;nk. (10)
These ￿rst-order conditions typically depend on the marginal cost of production
of all the merging ￿rm￿ s products. Therefore, in Bertrand competition, matters are
slightly more complicated than in Cournot competition. The reason for this asym-
metry is that increasing production of one commodity in a Cournot model will also
in￿ uence the prices of the other commodities, but it will not in￿ uence production
of the other commodities and hence will leave (marginal) costs unchanged. On the
other hand, increasing the price for a commodity will in￿ uence the demand of other
commodities and thereby change production and marginal costs for these other com-
modities, so that these do enter the ￿rst-order conditions.17 The endogenous marginal
cost levels that assure any particular Bertrand-Nash equilibrium are therefore less ob-
vious to extract.
In matrix notation, the pre-merger ￿rst-order conditions of the l merging ￿rms













Q11 0 ￿￿￿ 0
0 Q22
. . .






is assumed to be an invertible nl ￿ nl matrix with submatrices
Qij =
0























C C C C C C
A
: (12)
Similar to the matrix of quantity e⁄ects (6), matrix (12) represents the transpose
of the Jacobian matrix of demand functions of the products produced by ￿rm i,
with respect to the prices of the products produced by ￿rm j. Q0 thus collects all
pre-merger price-e⁄ects of all the commodities involved in the noti￿ed merger.










= 0 for i = 1;:::;nl,
17Compare equations (5) and (10).














Q11 Q21 ￿￿￿ Ql1
Q12 Q22
. . .






is assumed to be invertible.
Combining equation (11) and (13), the vector of CMCRs follows as￿ with sub-













Note that under the invertibility assumptions, the elements of 4cB are uniquely
determined.18
As a result of discontinuities in demand, the case of Bertrand competition in a
single homogenous commodity is not a straightforward special case of the analysis
above. Assume that the marginal costs of production are constant. If the ￿rms in-
volved are not equally e¢ cient, the most e¢ cient ￿rm would serve all of the market
pre-merger. Naturally, therefore, all production remains in that division post-merger.
Yet, prices are constrained by the production costs of each commodity￿ s nearest (po-
tential) contestant in terms of e¢ ciency. As a result, it is only mergers involving the
two most e¢ cient ￿rms that should raise antitrust concerns in homogenous goods
Bertrand competition. The CMCR of the pre-merger most e¢ cient ￿rm then needs
to be such that the pro￿t maximizing prices of the merged ￿rm are equal to the pre-
merger marginal costs of the second most cost-e¢ cient producer in the pre-merger
equilibrium (c2). That is, for this special case




and ￿cB = cB ￿ e cB: (15)
Note that it is still natural here to use pre-merger production levels as a benchmark
for the post-merger situation.
2.3 CMCRs in Partial Acquisitions
In both the US and Europe, competition authorities may challenge acquisitions of
part of one or more ￿rms. Partial acquisitions may raise competition concerns if the
integration of mutual interests implies control over a former rival. The relationship
between ownership and control is complex in general, but particularly so in the case
18The results obtained in Werden (1996) follow straightforwardly as a special case with l = 2 and
constant marginal costs.
11of partial and asymmetric equity ownership acquisitions. However, even when partial
equity ownership does not convey operating control, the linking of pro￿ts can pro-
vide anticompetitive unilateral incentives ranging from softened competition to full
joint pro￿t maximization.19 Furthermore, mergers by sequential partial acquisitions
may be a long-term concentration strategy.20 For these reasons, merger regulations
recognize the possibility of sole control, even in the case of quali￿ed minority share
holdings. Similarly, and particularly in the case of joint-ventures, there are poten-
tial e¢ ciencies in partial equity interests. In this subsection, we therefore determine
CMCRs for more general ownership structures.





w11 w12 ￿￿￿ w1nl
w21 w22







where 0 ￿ wij ￿ 1 is the equity share that ￿rm i has in ￿rm j. Assuming all pro￿ts
are indeed paid out to the owners,
Pn
i=1 wij = 1 for all j. Given the distribution of
ownership, ￿rm j maximizes its pro￿ts
Pnl
j=1 wij￿j, either by setting its production
level qj (in case of Cournot competition) or its price pj (in case of Bertrand competi-
tion), while taking into account the e⁄ect that the values of its own choice variables
have on the pro￿ts of the ￿rms it owns equity in.
For analytical convenience, and following Froeb and Tschantz (2001), we rescale
the ownership weights in such a way that wii = 1 for each i. Note that this can in
principle be done without a⁄ecting the optimization problem for individual ￿rms￿
although this may involve a slight rearranging of labels. Let this modi￿ed ownership
matrix be W. If each ￿rm produces exactly one product and obtains all pro￿ts from
that production, W equals the identity matrix. If a ￿rm produces several commodi-









corresponds to a situation where there are two ￿rms, of which the ￿rst produces the
￿rst two commodities and the second the third commodity. A full merger between
these two ￿rms would be presented by a new matrix consisting only of ones. Partial
mergers correspond in this framework to o⁄-diagonal elements wij taking on values
di⁄erent from 0 or 1. Note that the ownership matrix is typically not symmetric.
This setup allows for a straightforward expression of CMCRs when the ownership
structure changes from W0 to W1. Consider a market in Cournot competition.
19See Reynolds and Snapp (1986) and Reitman (1994).
20See Kamien and Zang (1993).





wij (qjPj (q) ￿ Cj (qj)): (16)
Note that we have specialized the cost structure to C (q) =
Pnj
j=1 Cj (qj). That is, we
abstract in the following from cross-cost e¢ ciencies, which would typically be very
complex to trace in partial mergers.
First-order conditions with respect to commodity i are given by






qj = 0, for i = 1;:::;nl;





where ￿ corresponds to the Hadamard product.21 Post-partial acquisition, that is,
















= (W0 ￿ W1)￿Pq
(nl): (17)
If ￿rms compete in prices, the analogous problem is ￿rm i maximizing pro￿ts with





wij (pjQj (p) ￿ Cj (Qj (p))); (18)
















Comparing these to the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions after the change in own-


























21The Hadamard, or entry-wise, product A￿B of two m1￿m2 matrices A and B gives an m1￿m2
matrix for which the (i;j)-element is given by aijbij.
133 The Werden-Froeb-Index
The generalized CMCRs characterized above are commodity-speci￿c and may vary
considerably over the products involved in the merger. For practical use of the concept
in merger control, the Werden-Froeb-Index collects the di⁄erent CMCRs into an
average required (marginal) cost savings. The WFI is de￿ned generally as
WFI =
Pnl




c ￿ q(nl) ; (20)
that is, as the sum of CMCRs, each weighted by the quantity produced, divided by
the sum of the product of marginal costs and quantity.22
The WFI can be thought of as the average percentage of cost savings required to
replicate the pre-merger market outcome. It weighs those required e¢ ciencies that
need to materialize on the products that have a larger share in total production more
than on less important products. The WFI summarizes the generalized CMCRs in
a single statistic, providing a measure of the total relative decrease in the total mar-
ginal costs of producing the commodities involved in the merger required to preserve
the status quo. It gives an idea of how much more cost e¢ cient the merged ￿rm
must produce after the merger for its merger-speci￿c e¢ ciency gains to overcome the
merger￿ s anticompetitive e⁄ects.
Using the generalized CMCRs derived above for the case of Cournot and Bertrand
competition, the WFI specializes to the following two measures. When ￿rms compete
in quantities:
WFIC =
(P0 ￿ P1)q(nl) ￿ q(nl)
c ￿ q(nl) =
￿
q(nl)￿T (P0 ￿ P1)
T q(nl)
c ￿ q(nl) ;
with, using equations (17), P0 = W0 ￿ P and P1 = W1 ￿ P, in case of partial
acquisitions.23
22Alternatively, the CMCRs can be weighted by the merger-involved commodities￿share in rev-
enue. The behavior of the thus de￿ned index is very similar to the WFI, but is both less natural
and not so convenient to apply.














































for two merging products j and k. This is exactly ￿the proportionate reduction in marginal cost
necessary to restore the pre-merger price￿ , or equation (4), in Froeb and Werden (1998), p.368.



















c ￿ q(nl) ;
in which to replace, using equations (19), Q0 = W0 ￿Q and Q1 = W1 ￿Q in case of
partial acquisitions.
Since the CMCR values are unique, and pre-merger sales volumes are given, note
that the value of the WFI for each type of competition is unique. Furthermore,
the index satis￿es several natural axioms regarding proportionality and commensu-
rability. If all relative CMCRs,
￿ci
ci , are identical, then the WFI is equal to this
relative required reduction. If the unit of measurement of marginal costs changes,
the value of the WFI is una⁄ected.24 The WFI is determinate in marginal costs and
quantities￿ although the likelihood of the required post-merger cost levels falling be-
low zero increases when pre-merger marginal cost levels are close to zero. Finally,
the measure deals quite naturally with required e¢ ciencies that are so large that
post-merger production costs would need to fall below zero, since in the event that
4ci > ci, the value of the WFI is high.
4 Information Requirements
Since, by construction, post- and pre-merger quantities and prices are identical, cal-
culating the WFI for the purpose of merger control requires a relatively low amount
of information that is directly observable. Since the CMCRs are a local measure,
the WFI is independent of the speci￿c functional forms of market demand and cost
of production. It only uses information on the commodities that are involved in the
proposed merger. More speci￿cally, apart from existing and proposed ownership ma-
trices, it su¢ ces to know the quantities sold of the products o⁄ered by the merging
￿rms prior to the merger (q(l)), the sales prices (p(nl)), the nature of competition
(Cournot or Bertrand), and depending on the latter, the matrix of the a⁄ected com-
modities￿quantity-e⁄ects (P1 in the case of Cournot competition) or price-e⁄ects
(Q1 in the case of Bertrand competition), both evaluated at the pre-merger mar-
ket equilibrium. Matrices P0 and Q0 follow directly from P1 and Q1 by setting all
appropriate elements equal to zero.
It is common practice in merger control to obtain and evaluate demand elasticity
matrices, rather than just the derivatives and cross-derivatives of (inverse) demand.
Regular demand elasticity matrices premultiply price over quantity by the partial
derivative of demand with respect to price. The information on Q1 necessary to
establish CMCRs in a market in Bertrand competition can therefore be recovered
24Note that a change in all quantities by the same factor does in general a⁄ect the value of the
WFI, since it implies a discrete shift in production. The requirement of proportionality in quantities,
however, is not in line with the status quo nature of the analysis.
15from standard demand elasticity information, using information on q(l) and p(nl).25
It is not equally straightforward to determine P1 on the basis of regular demand
elasticities. That would require separate speci￿c information on the ￿ inverse demand
elasticities￿ , which is not a common concept.
Alternatively, information may be available on either the full n￿n Jacobian ma-
trix of price-e⁄ects or the full n￿n Jacobian matrix of quantity-e⁄ects. In that case,
the one follows directly as the inverse of the other. Obviously, to know the price- or
quantity e⁄ects of all commodities in the relevant market is a considerably stronger in-
formation requirement than the information on only the a⁄ected commodities. Yet,
it may be that certain proportionality assumptions apply market wide that allow
to construct the full Jacobian from limited information. In Epstein and Rubinfeld
(2001), for example, on the assumption that substitution between products is accord-
ing to their relative market shares, a full approximate demand-elasticity matrix is
constructed on the basis of information only about the industry elasticity of demand
plus one own-price elasticity. Variations to this speci￿c proportionality assumption
obviously return di⁄erent matrices.
The denominator of the index uses the marginal cost of production. It is not
necessary to separately obtain this information, however, as the marginal costs of
production are implied by the ￿rst-order conditions (8) for Cournot competition and
(13) for Bertrand competition. The di⁄erent marginal production cost levels can
straightforwardly be recovered, given sales prices and traded volumes.26 Total actual
(variable) costs of production could be used as a proxy for the base. Although this
would stay true to the conceptual nature of the WFI, the use of accounting data is
unreliable. Firms may furthermore attempt to manipulate the WFI values of their
merger downwards by overstating pre-merger production costs. Finally note that,
if need be, the CMCRs and WFI can straightforwardly be formulated in terms of
diversion ratios, a concept used in Shapiro (1996) in Werden (1996).



























where D(q) and D(p) are diagonal matrices, in which the (i;i)th element is qi or pi, respectively.
26This is identical to using the Lerner-index for this purpose. See Dansby and Willig (1979), or
the discussion in Neven et al. (1994).
165 The WFI in Merger Control
In their assessment of horizontal mergers, competition authorities attach considerable
value to the Hirschman-Her￿ndahl-index (HHI) as a measure of market concentration.
Merger regulations and guidelines specify threshold values of the HHI for the purpose
of self-assessment. Given that the combination of the absolute value of the HHI and
the change in its value, ￿HHI, remains below speci￿ed critical values, competition
authorities in both the US and Europe are unlikely to ￿nd horizontal competition
concerns, as stated in their respective merger guidelines.27 Only if either of these
measures, or both, surpass these values is a deeper Phase II investigation entered.
The use of the HHI for the purpose of assessing whether a merger can be ex-
pected to lead to a ￿substantial lessening￿or ￿signi￿cant impediment￿of e⁄ective
competition is not without problems, however. The measure can be deceptively
straightforward and miss the competitive discipline of potential entrants, for exam-
ple in bidding markets. But also in markets where it does apply, the HHI does not
discriminate between detrimental and socially desirable mergers. Furthermore, the
proper determination of the relevant market is complex and controversial. Also, the
HHI uses pre-merger markets shares, thus ignoring the post-merger market e⁄ects
that it is intended to advise on. Firms may, in reply, attempt to tailor their merger
plans so as to stay just within the HHI safe-haven. Most importantly, the analysis is
of no assistance in assessing merger-speci￿c e¢ ciency gains. Instead, these only come
into consideration in a full Phase II inquiry, which is costly and may have unpre-
dictable outcomes. As a result, it is di¢ cult for ￿rms to self-assess their possibilities
for a successful e¢ ciency defense.
The WFI can supplement merger control by providing guidance in this. This
would extend the de minimus doctrine to include e¢ ciency claims. As a matter
of standard procedure, in notifying a horizontal merger ￿rms would be required to
submit the value of the WFI for their proposed merger￿ along with documented cal-
culations.28 This value complements the more general argumentation that e¢ ciency
gains can indeed be expected to materialize as a result of the merger. The burden
of proof therefore remains on the parties proposing the merger. The validity of the
submitted analysis is to be assessed by the competition authorities and can be chal-
lenged, in which case the merger can be blocked. The merger guidelines would specify
threshold values of the WFI which, in combination with critical HHI values, would
in principle allow the merger, even when it does raise competition concerns. That is,
a su¢ ciently low (and credible) WFI value can compensate an HHI or ￿HHI value
27In the US, this is so for all mergers for which the HHI remains below 1000 and all for which
￿HHI remain below 50, as well as for any combination of HHI, ￿HHI below 1800 and 100￿ see
Section 1.5 of US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade Commission (1997). In the EU,
these critical values are HHI=1000, ￿HHI=150, and those combinations below 2000 and 250￿ see
paragraphs 19 and 20 of Commission of the European Communities (2004).
28Appendix A provides an algorithm in MATLAB
R ￿
for this purpose. See http://w￿.acle.nl for a
user-friendly on-line version.
17over and above the safe-haven thresholds. A Phase II investigation will only be ini-
tiated if unreasonably high compensating cost reductions are necessary to overcome
the anti-competitive e⁄ects of the merger. Alternatively, a second and upper-bound
critical (delta) HHI value may be speci￿ed, such that a Phase II investigation is al-
ways entered when the merger surpasses this upper-bound threshold, irrespective of
its WFI.
To illustrate the proposed application of the WFI and its power in supplement-
ing HHI analysis, consider a hypothetical representative pre-merger market in which
eight ￿rms are in Bertrand competition, each producing a single commodity. Table 1
speci￿es regular prices, quantities and demand elasticities of each of these commodi-
ties.29
# Price Volume 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 400 36.0 -1.500 0.010 0.200 0.045 0.125 0.425 0.001 0.020
2 450 15.0 0.001 -1.500 0.211 0.061 0.110 0.425 0.005 0.015
3 483 25.7 0.377 0.095 -1.500 0.045 0.201 0.415 0.001 0.013
4 375 33.1 0.085 0.029 0.050 -2.400 0.910 0.515 0.006 0.035
5 365 93.6 0.085 0.035 0.065 0.175 -2.450 0.100 0.150 0.100
6 400 161.8 0.045 0.015 0.036 0.065 0.100 -1.400 0.300 0.035
7 410 100.6 0.050 0.020 0.020 0.315 0.100 0.200 -2.900 0.100
8 390 10.0 0.010 0.010 0.100 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.300 -3.300
Table 1: Prices, sales volumes (in thousands) and elasticities in representative market.
Between the eight ￿rms, there are twenty-eight di⁄erent complete two-party merg-
ers possible. For all these potential combinations, Figure 1 plots the WFIB versus
￿HHI.30 Two vertical lines mark the lowest threshold values of ￿HHI= 50 for US
merger regulation, and ￿HHI= 150 for EU merger control. As explained above, below
these values, mergers are in principle not challenged, independent of their absolute
HHI value. A potential threshold value for the WFIB is drawn in at 10%.
The ￿gure reiterates the weak relationship between CMCRs and HHI or ￿HHI
pointed out by Werden and Froeb in their papers. The mergers that are grouped
in the lower-left corner of the ￿gure remain below the EU and/or US threshold val-
ues for ￿HHI and require only relatively low e¢ ciency gains as measured by the
WFIB. Allowing these mergers to be consummated on standard HHI assessment is
in principle correct. Yet, a number of mergers involve high levels of either ￿HHI or
29The elasticity matrix is so de￿ned that, for example, entry (1;2) represents the elasticity of the






30Although this example was constructed, it was inspired by an actual merger. Moreover, it
is generic, in that the qualitative e⁄ects are robust to (substantial) changes in all the underlying
data. The reader is invited to work with the example, or any other set of merger data, using the
MATLAB
R ￿
routine in Appendix A. Note that the dot in the origin of Figure 1 represents eight
overlaying cases of ￿rms merging with themselves.
18Figure 1: WFIB versus ￿HHI for representative mergers.
WFIB. Consider the merger labelled A in Figure 1, which is between ￿rms 1 and
3, which are both relatively small with respective market shares of 7:6% and 6:5%.
The HHI increases through this merger from 2114 to 2213, that is, ￿HHI= 99: The
merger￿ s WFIB value is 45:8%. By relying on HHI-analysis alone, without quanti-
fying e¢ ciency gains, this merger would in principle pass European (albeit not US)
merger control without remedies, even though it requires considerable merger speci￿c
e¢ ciency gains to overcome the anticompetitive e⁄ects of the merger.
Merger B, as another example, has a ￿HHI= 47 and would therefore probably
not be challenged in either jurisdiction. It is a merger of ￿rm 2 with ￿rm 3. Firm
2 has a market share of 3:6%, which is smaller than that of ￿rm 1. In addition, the
cross-price elasticity of ￿rm 3￿ s commodity with respect to the price of commodity
1 is roughly fourfold that of commodity 3 with respect to the price of commodity
2. As a result, the WFIB is substantially lower, yet still as high as 20:1%, which
may be too much to expect to materialize as a result of the merger. Relying only on
standard HHI analysis, without a proper assessment of merger speci￿c e¢ ciencies,
therefore poses a risk of Type II error, that is, of allowing a merger that should have
been blocked from the point of view of consumer welfare.
19An example of a merger with the opposite danger is merger C, which is between
￿rms 5 (market share: 18%) and 6 (market share: 34:1%). Here, the HHI increases
to 3339, that is ￿HHI = 1225, as a result of the substantial market shares of the
two ￿rms involved in the merger. Yet, the WFIB = 7:9%. Even though the merger
would certainly be challenged, trigger an in-depth investigation, and quite possibly
be blocked under both European and US merger regulations, the e¢ ciencies mini-
mally needed for this merger to be welfare enhancing are relatively low. Therefore,
Phase II investigation costs could be saved if our proposal to include WFI analysis
in merger regulation would be adopted. Indeed, supplementing merger control with
WFI analysis has the largest potential for saving on enforcement costs in this cat-
egory. Mergers that stay below a set WFI threshold value and an additional ￿HHI
threshold need then not enter into a Phase II investigation, whereas they would under
the present merger criteria.31
The described use of the WFI has a number of bene￿ts. The WFI is an exact
and well-de￿ned measure, that requires information that is standard available in the
market. The measure is easy to interpret and standardizes the submission of evidence
for an e¢ ciency defense in Phase I inquiries. The WFI is independent of the functional
form of demand and costs, and not sensitive to other model speci￿cs as costly merger
simulation analyses often are. Therefore, there is little room for presenting overly
rosy e¢ ciency claims. At best, the merging parties can downwardly manipulate the
WFI by overstating their post-merger own-elasticities and under-stating their cross-
elasticities. This respectively gives the impression of more than actual competition
for their products generally, and less than actual competition between the merger-
involved commodities. This reduces the anti-competitive e⁄ects of the merger, so that
its WFI value will be lower. The space for such manipulations is limited, however.
Also, wider de￿nitions of the relevant market that reduce market shares have only
little e⁄ect on the WFI.
As the minimally required e¢ ciencies are compared to a ￿xed target that is spec-
i￿ed in the guidelines, use of the WFI leaves little scope for rent seeking by the
notifying ￿rms. As a result, the measure avoids complex and expensive litigation and
administrative procedures. As a single statistic, the index can be published without
publicly revealing the underlying data, which is often con￿dential. In addition, in the
case of divestitures or partial mergers, threshold WFI values can guide allowable mu-
tual equity acquisitions. Furthermore, the WFI is inherently based on the consumer
welfare standard￿ which is the principle guidance for both US and EU competition
authorities. As a measure of minimally required e¢ ciencies, any merger-speci￿c gains
that would materialize over and above it would directly bene￿t consumers in the post-
merger equilibrium.
The WFI furthermore is an upper-bound requirement. In line with the consumer
31This second ￿HHI threshold value would have to be established on the basis of systematic
research. Note also that, at a threshold WFI-value of 5%, there remains a Type II error candidate:
merger D between ￿rms 5 (18%) and 7 (21;7%), which returns a ￿HHI= 781, yet the WFIB = 2:9%.
20welfare standard, it disallows ￿xed costs synergies that would potentially contribute
to total welfare. It further does not take into account more sophisticated long-term
bene￿ts that may result from the merger, such as product innovations from combined
R&D e⁄orts, which are very di¢ cult to quantify. Moreover, as noted above, the con-
cept of the CMCRs￿ and consequently the WFI￿ expressly ignores any post-merger
cost-minimizing redistribution of production to those division(s) in the merged ￿rm
with the most e¢ cient production technology. In simple settings with a homogenous
good produced at constant marginal costs of production, such post-merger realloca-
tions are relatively straightforward, since all production will be located in the single
most e¢ cient ￿rm. However, to determine post-merger production levels at mini-
mally required e¢ ciency gains generally requires considerably more information on
the merging ￿rms. In e⁄ect, it would involve a fully speci￿ed model of the relevant
market, including global information of the multi-product production and cost func-
tions, the functional form and speci￿cation of all demands, and possible capacity
constraints of all ￿rms. This goes counter to the conceptual idea of the CMCRs as
a local measure. It would remove the bene￿t of using the WFI as a practical statis-
tic in merger control. The implication of ignoring post-merger cost minimization is
that the WFI structurally overestimates the truly required marginal cost reductions
that compensate consumers for the anti-competitive e⁄ects of the merger.32 If im-
plemented in future merger guidelines bearing this in mind, however, the WFI can
facilitate self-assessment and focus enforcement.
Finally, note that in order to determine what would be proper threshold values for
the WFI to be included in future horizontal merger guidelines is￿ with the caveats
pointed out above￿ a policy decision that is no di⁄erent from the speci￿cation of the
present HHI safe-havens. These values may consequently di⁄er similarly across en-
forcement regimes. Perhaps anything below 5 per cent can be accepted as reasonably
low, or maybe 10 per cent, as drawn in Figure 1. One possible way to substantiate
these thresholds departs from the following observation. In the past two decades
of merger control, a number of mergers initially challenged were eventually cleared
after a Phase II investigation or by a court inquiry￿ with or without divestitures.
Apparently, despite raising competition concerns, these mergers satis￿ed an implicit
standard of merger-speci￿c bene￿ts. Using these past decisions, the implied value of
the WFI can be backed out to provide some guidance in this policy matter. We leave
this for further research.
6 Concluding Remarks
The stakes in merger control are high and merit a full weighing of all likely con-
sequences of noti￿ed mergers and (partial) acquisitions before deciding to block or
32This is conceptually comparable to the Laspeyres price index overestimating the true-cost-of-
living index. See Fisher and Shell (1998), Chapter 2, for a survey.
21clear them. Even more so than a merger￿ s e⁄ects on competition, any claimed merger-
speci￿c e¢ ciencies are hard to substantiate and di¢ cult for the authorities to verify.
The WFI assists in this assessment. The measure integrates concentration and e¢ -
ciency e⁄ects, and asks what average percentage of total (variable) cost savings need
minimally materialize as a result of the merger to compensate consumers for its anti-
competitive e⁄ects. If the WFI is low, the burden of proof on the proponents of the
merger can be lower than when considerable compensating e¢ ciencies are required.
Threshold values can be set, below which no extensive investigation is required. The
WFI is a point measure that is straightforward to implement, exact, informationally
e¢ cient, well-behaved and natural to interpret. It standardizes merger procedures.
The measure can provide legal guidance in self-assessment and facilitate the mounting
of an e¢ ciency defense, without necessarily opening a full merger inquiry.
Obviously, standardizing the e¢ ciency defense in future horizontal merger guide-
lines along the lines here proposed does not relieve the competition authorities from
their obligation to carefully assess every merger case. In particular, by ignoring e¢ -
cient reallocations of production, possible increases in product variety, as well as ￿xed
cost savings, the WFI tends to overestimate the minimally required e¢ ciencies. De-
pending on global variability in the cost-functions and the relative (cross-)elasticities,
therefore, the test may be too strict and lead to desirable mergers being nevertheless
blocked. Our proposal to apply the WFI ￿rstly as a ￿lter to Phase II investigations
partly remedies this problem.
Finally, as with all standardized tests, also the WFI-analysis can be tricked. In
particular, notifying ￿rms can attempt to manipulate the matrix with estimates of
quantity- or price-e⁄ects. As the local derivatives of demand relate to the availability
of substitute commodities, and thus indirectly to the number of ￿rms and the dif-
ferentiation of their products, the determination of the relevant market, through a
SSNIP-test or otherwise, remains a crucial aspect of the analysis. In a more sophis-
ticated manner, in anticipation of a merger ￿rms may want to in￿ uence sales prices
and quantities. The latter is also a possibility under only the HHI standard, however.
Moreover, our generic examples of mergers have so far shown the WFI to be robust
to such variations. Faced with the reality that competition law enforcement is costly,
the WFI therefore can reliably enhance merger control by facilitating a standardized
two-tier e¢ ciency defense.
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25A A MATLAB
R ￿
Routine for Calculating WFIs
To illustrate the ease of use of the WFI in merger control, consider the following simple
routine, written in MATLAB
R ￿
for mergers typically encountered by competition
authorities.33 It calculates the WFI for a full merger between any number of ￿rms,
which may pre-merger produce several commodities, in a market that competes in
prices.
The required inputs for the software are the matrix of elasticities of commodities
involved in the merger (Em), the column vector of status quo prices (pv), and the
column vector of status quo quantities (qv), as measured on the market. The user
can then specify the row vector prior, which has the same dimension as pv and
qv. For this vector, enter 0 for all products that remain outside of the merger,
and a positive number for all products that are involved in the merger, such that:
(i) products produced by the same ￿rm pre-merger get the same number; and (ii)
products produced by di⁄erent ￿rms pre-merger get di⁄erent numbers. For example,
prior = [1 1 0 2 2 0 1] represents a merger between two ￿rms, in which pre-merger
products 1, 2 and 7 are produced by one of the merging ￿rms, products 4 and 5 by
the other merging ￿rm, and products 3 and 6 by non-merging ￿rms.
The routine returns the full matrix of price e⁄ects, recovered from the elasticity-
matrix, pre- and post-merger matrices of price-e⁄ect, Q0 and Q1, the vector of mar-
ginal production costs, c(nl), the vector of absolute CMCRs, 4cB, and, of course, the
value of the WFIB:
function [Q,Q1,Q0,c,dc,wfib]=wfibmultiple(Em,pv,qv,prior);
Q=(diag(qv)*Em*inv(diag(pv)))￿; % recovering price-effects from elasticities
n=max(size(Em)); % determining the number of firms










L=logical(prior); % deleting nonmerging firms
33See http://w￿.acle.nl for a user-friendly on-line version.
26Q0=Q0(L,L); % deleting nonmerging firms, pre-merger
Q1=Q(L,L); % deleting nonmerging firms, post-merger
pvr=pv(L); % consider relevant prices
qvr=qv(L); % consider relevant quantities
c=pvr+inv(Q0)*qvr; % pre-merger marginal costs
dc=(inv(Q0)-inv(Q1))*qvr; % absolute CMCRs
wfib=(dc￿*qvr)/(c￿*qvr); % WFI
Q % writing output:
Q0
Q1
c
dc
wfib
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